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BUILDING BLOCKS

AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOPMENT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: Despite almost universal endorsement of human rights and democratic rule, the majority of humankind is currently governed in a repressive militarized manner. Authoritarian rule is especially prevalent throughout the Third World.

For many reasons, there is an international authoritarian structure that interacts and complements various national structures. Its stability is sustained, to the extent possible, by ideological forms of hegemony. Appeals to nationalism or to dynastic and political myths are made to rationalize what is happening, especially to obscure the dominance of outsiders in relation to processes of capital formation and distribution. Persuasive techniques generally are insufficient in national situations of manifest dependency. Hence, the reliance on para-military and military instruments of power to maintain stability.

One of the purposes of this project has been to discover whether economic and political "space" exists within Third World countries to propose and promote non-authoritarian images of development. A normative postulate of this inquiry is to regard the question "development for what?" to be answered as follows: "production to meet basic human needs" for the overwhelming majority of the population, as well as an economic process guided by autonomous national forces.

AUTHORITARISME ET DEVELOPPEMENT: UNE PERSPECTIVE GLOBALE

Résumé: En dépit de l'adhésion quasi universelle aux principes des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie, la majorité de l'humanité est à l'heure actuelle gouvernée par des régimes militaires répressifs. L'autoritarisme est particulièrement répandu dans le Tiers Monde.

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Une structure autoritaire internationale est le complément de diverses structures nationales. Sa stabilité est maintenue, dans la mesure du possible, par les formes idéologiques de l'hégémonie. On utilise le nationalisme ou des mythes dynastiques ou politiques pour justifier ce qui se passe réellement, notamment pour obscurcir la domination extérieure dans les processus de l'accumulation du capital et de la distribution. Les techniques de persuasion sont généralement insuffisantes dans des situations de dépendance manifeste. D'où le recours à des instruments de pouvoir militaires ou paramilitaires.

L'un des objectifs de ce projet a été de découvrir s'il existe un espace économique et politique, dans les pays du Tiers Monde, pour formuler et proposer une vision non autoritaire du développement. Un postulat normatif de cette enquête a été de répondre de la façon suivante à la question 'Développement pour quoi?': pour satisfaire les besoins humains fondamentaux de la grande majorité de la population par le moyen d'un processus économique guidé par des forces nationales autonomes.

AUTORITARISMO Y DESARROLLO: UNA PERSPECTIVE GLOBAL

Resumen: A pesar del aval casi universal del principio de derechos humanos y de la doctrina política democrática, la gran mayoría de la humanidad queda actualmente bajo gobiernos represivos y militares. El autoritarismo predomina en las formas de gobierno en el Tercer Mundo.

Por varias razones, existe una estructura autoritaria internacional que obra recíprocamente y como complemento de las estructuras nacionales. En gran parte las formas ideológicas de hegemonía sostienen su estabilidad. Se recurre al nacionalismo o a mitos dinásticos y políticos para racionalizar lo que ocurre, y especialmente para ofuscar el papel dominante de forasteros en relación a los procesos para la formación de capital y la distribución. Por lo general la persuasión no es suficiente en situaciones nacionales de dependencia manifiesta. Por lo tanto es necesario depender de los instrumentos militares y para-militares del poder para mantener la estabilidad.

Un fin de este proyecto ha sido de descubrir si existe dentro de los países del Tercer Mundo un espacio político y económico para promover y proponer conceptos no autoritarios de desarrollo. El postulado normativo es de preguntarse 'desarrollo para que?' y la respuesta debe ser la siguiente: 'producción para cumplir con las necesidades humanas básicas para la gran mayoría del pueblo dentro de un proceso económico dirigido por fuerzas nacionales autónomas'.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOPMENT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

THE GLOBAL SETTING OF AUTHORITARIANISM

I

Despite almost universal endorsement of human rights and democratic rule, the overwhelming majority of humankind is currently governed in a repressive militarized manner. Authoritarian rule is especially prevalent throughout the Third World.

Two types of general analyses exist to explain this prevalence of authoritarian rule. The first type concentrates on domestic factors, especially the political economy of state-building. There are many variations among such explanations, but their common feature is a stress on the mode of capital accumulation process relied upon to achieve economic priorities. One feature of these explanations concerns the fairness of income distribution patterns and policies, as well as the degree of progress achieved in relation to the elimination of mass poverty. Political awareness is steadily increasing in Third World societies, and is closely associated with rapidly rising rates of urbanization. In these circumstances economic unfairness or inefficiency generates popular unrest on a scale that can usually be inhibited only through repressive techniques of government - hence, it is not surprising that authoritarian rule emerges, nor is it surprising that it assumes many forms. The political center, expressed through moderate forms of governance including a constrained state and a balance between the public and private sector, does not respond to either the cultural or economic imperatives of the Third World. Both the weight of tradition and the gravity of the economic situation polarize the political context. At present, additional exceptional pressures on the governing process, regardless of its ideological identity, also arise from demographic trends (an unprecedented period of explosive population increase and rapid rural-urban migration patterns) and from aroused psycho-political expectations. One thing the right and left have in common is an underdeveloped sensitivity to abuses of state power. Hence, it is virtually inevitable, at least at this historical stage, that polarized politics produces authoritarian rule in some form. In time, through the negative experience of authoritarian rule, a wider appreciation of democratic values is emerging and influencing thought and action across the entire political spectrum. But, by and large, the turn away from authoritarianism in the Third World remains a hope for the future.

As matters currently stand, domestic explanations of authoritarian rule hold for ideological fixes on the left, as well as for those on the right. Governing processes taking their inspiration from the left stress the expansion of production and the building up of self-reliant national capabilities. The private sector is eliminated or marginalized, and all economic and political power passed to the state. The left-oriented state tends to impose a fairly uniform level of austerity, aggravated by an insistence on ideological conformity generally justified as an aspect of healthy and efficient collective spirit, and as necessary to defend against counterrevolutionary danger.

The ideological right also inclines toward authoritarian solutions. Rightist

leadership often reflects an underlying coalition that includes traditional elites, the military, technocrats, and managers of corporate and banking activities. The right has the distinctive problem of governing an impoverished mass in the face of a manifestly privileged elite, often aligned with and dependent upon outsiders. Such alignment and dependency generally introduces corruption as a pervasive feature, is tied to non-productive and aristocratic land tenure systems and erodes the legitimacy of claims to rule on behalf of the whole society. That is, the misery of the poor can be generally associated in capitalist Third World politics with the manifest abuses of the rich, including deference to foreign interests and cultural values. Given widespread sentiments of resentment among Third World masses, such a structure is not acceptable and can be only sustained through the workings of an efficient bureaucratic machine of repression, backed up to the extent possible by efforts to mystify and mislead public opinion.

These domestic analyses of repression are complemented by international structural analyses of various types: Marxist-Leninist international class analysis, as supplemented by the dependencia school and by post-Marxist structuralism stressing the hierarchical dynamics of core, semi-periphery, and periphery state actors. In effect, the authoritarian internal politics of periphery and semi-periphery (intermediate industrialized states - Brazil, Argentina, South Korea; resource rich states, especially OPEC) states is a highly conditioned, if not virtually inevitable outcome of their dependent integration into the world economic system. A situation of prolonged economic dependency (or imperial control if looked upon from a North-to-South direction) also has cultural effects, including the repression of indigenous social, economic and political patterns.

For many reasons, then, there is an international authoritarian structure that interacts and complements various national structures. Its stability is sustained, to the extent possible, by ideological forms of hegemony. Appeals to nationalism or to dynastic and political myths are made to rationalize what is happening, especially to obscure the dominance of outsiders in relation to processes of capital formation and distribution. Persuasive techniques generally are insufficient in national situations of manifest dependency. Hence, the reliance on para-military and military instruments of power to maintain stability. The international system imposes this requirement of stability as an essential precondition for the attraction of capital from public and private overseas sources, and without such outside capital plans for economic growth are likely to be thwarted. Hence, it is the domestic shortage of capital that underlies the paradox of formal independence being rapidly supplanted by economic dependence throughout the Third World. One expression of this dependence is the existence of high levels of public indebtedness to foreign creditors. Patterns of indebtedness at any level of social organization express a reality of dependence. The other side of dependence is the impulse to control via the exertion of discipline. In essence, this means suppressing the demands and claims of the poor, especially where a large labour reserve exists, as it does, in the Third World. In effect, then, maintaining capital flows requires Third World governments to provide assurance of stability which leads almost inevitably in these circumstances to authoritarianism in some form. These economic elements are reinforced by geopolitical patterns, especially superpower rivalry, in which leading First World states seek to maintain "control" over the internal political life of Third World countries, especially to assure the control of the governing process by sympathetic and stable rulers.

II

In the present world setting, Third World governments are unable to avoid issues of values as embedded in "development" policy. The liberal fix that has allowed a distribution of benefits such that secures the willing acquiescence of the great majority of populations in the democracies of the North is not generally available to leaders of the South. First of all, the North had available to it the extra wealth and income arising from its exploitation of the South, expressed especially in terms of cheap raw materials, especially energy. Secondly, the working classes of the North, with some notable exceptions, did not assert their demands in any effective form during the early buildup of industrial capitalism. Thirdly, high rates of population growth in the last two decades have added further to escalating demands on governmental capacities, especially for public welfare goods. Fourthly, an altered view of the role of government and the character of human rights such as to confer upon governments the duty to provide and the right of individuals to receive what is needed by way of food, clothing, shelter, health, and education.

It should also be noticed that with the increased assertiveness of the Third World, via OPEC and elsewhere, it is increasingly doubtful whether the liberal option will persist much longer in the North. Increasingly, inflation, unemployment, falling rates of growth are undermining economic policies that depend upon a sufficient surplus to achieve high rates of savings and investment and a rising standard of living for all social classes. In the face of this "crisis", there are predictions from conservative circles (e.g., The Trilateral Commission) of "a crisis of democracy" and from progressive circles of an emergent polarization between "left" and "right" in late capitalist polities. That is, the threat of authoritarian rule has clearly become a global problem, engulfing all sectors. Concern cannot be properly confined to the actualities of widespread repression in the Third World. As such, authoritarianism appears to be a world order problem, its character associated with the overall structure of global relations.

What seems evident is that Third World countries will not have an easy time "developing" in non-authoritarian, humane ways. Yet, at the same time, prevailing justification for authoritarian rule, by way of efficiency and growth, are losing their empirical support. One of our purposes in this project has been to discover whether economic and political "space" exists within Third World countries to propose and promote non-authoritarian images of development. A normative postulate of this inquiry is to regard the question "development for what?" to be answered as follows: "production to meet basic human needs" for the overwhelming majority of the population, as well as an economic process guided by autonomous national forces.

In this project, it has been our conviction that the positive possibility of non-authoritarian rule cannot be understood by looking only at the domestic level of economic/political choice and structure. It requires also careful consideration of the biasing pressures that derive from "outside" of the state and are manipulated by external actors in distinctive, obscure, and only partly understood ways. In this regard the interaction of the international economic and political order with that of domestic society becomes a crucial focus of inquiry. In part, this interaction involves grasping the role of trans-national corporations and banks, as well as international financial institutions

in the development process of particular countries (see below summary of Robin Broad's study of transnational impact on Philippines development). This emphasis challenges the conventional wisdom, admittedly questioned more and more from a variety of directions, as to whether foreign investment or even "multilateral aid" is an unmitigated benefit for a poor or debt-burdened country. Such questioning is even more insistent with respect to the development effects of "foreign aid" of a conventional bilateral variety.

With the falling away of formal colonial structures, there had been an orthodox view that the problems of "imperialism" were matters of history. Now, it is evident that the very structure of the international economic, political, and cultural order enables the persistence, although in altered form, of earlier patterns of domination and dependence. New forms emerge to discharge the functions of the old forms, but the continuities are notable, requiring exposure and further struggle. In that sense, the post-colonial nationalism of the Cuban, Nicaraguan, or Iranian Revolutions are of paramount interest (see below for summary of John Cavanagh's Iran study) as are the post-colonial counterrevolutions of such countries as Chile since 1973.

"Geopolitics" in the restricted sense of superpower rivalry, interventionary diplomacy, and spheres of influence plays an important part in imposing the kind of ruling process that is disinclined to non-authoritarian rule. Some new tendencies are evident here too. The use of "surrogate" actors to carry out Third World policing and paramilitary (recruited generally from the semi-periphery) missions is one dimension of this new geopolitics. Covert operations - staging coups, stabilizing "friends", destabilizing "enemies" - is another way by which invisible, or semi-visible, control over the discretionary politics of Third World politics is maintained.

More subtle, perhaps more sinister, are the spread of governing and consumption "needs" that induce an emphasis on militarization (arms purchases) and luxury goods. Sometimes, the interaction is crude and self-evident; the socialization of the Shah included building up his exorbitant appetite for modern armaments, helping to make arms exporters into a growth industry as well as earning dollars to pay the increased costs of oil imports and building manifest links of dependency. At the end of the Shah's rule, as many as 45,000 Americans were in Iran, mainly associated with hyper-modern weapons systems that Iranians could not use or repair on their own. Given that kind of foreign-induced militarization, it is almost inevitable that domestic governance will find itself isolated from the people. In these circumstances, it is inevitable that the political process will grow militarized. In Iran's case, neither the oil cushion, nor the liberalizing tactics of "land reform" and "White Revolution" were able to neutralize any significant element of the social order. In part, the remarkable strength of popular resistance to imperial strategy in Iran reveals the importance of the non-material dimensions of nationalism, especially cultural and religious motivation, but it also suggests the obsolescence of certain "new" forms of imperialism.

After Iran, we are on the verge of a dangerous period of neo-neo imperial "experimentation". The push for "quick reaction" military forces, buttressed by "over-the-horizon" naval forces, a revival of Cold War rhetoric and mood, and a resource-oriented ideology of interventionary diplomacy are elements in the new approach. In the American case, this suggests a new readiness for Vietnam-type enterprises to assure the maintenance of vital zones of control

over Third World political/economic self-determination. In the Soviet case, it suggests a catching up phase, exemplified by its Vietnam-type intervention in Afghanistan; the Soviet Union tends to be a tactical tempo behind the United States in the persisting superpower "geopolitical race". The effects of such vigorous interventionary capabilities and ventures is certainly to move the Third World target polities in the direction of reliable governing process, which almost certainly entails authoritarian rule of some kind. At best, a defensive outlook by Third World governments worried about the prospect of interventions of any sort will undoubtedly continue to serve as a rationale/rationalization for building up surveillance and anti-subversion bureaucracies, that is, the modern infrastructure of authoritarianism.

In this global setting it is also essential to be aware of the extent to which economic/political/cultural choices in the North affect the extent of needs-oriented development space in the South. The case of "conservation" and "alternating energy" sources, lessened dependence on imported energy, is obviously relevant. To the extent that such dependence is reduced, it correspondingly lessens the impulse to control (and distort) the autonomous politics/economics of Third World countries. It allows for more relaxed, moderate foreign policies to emerge in the North.

But the issues of Northern choice are far more extensive. Export-led growth in armaments production necessarily turns key countries in the North into "pushers", "merchants of death". Conversion plans involving a more productive, needs-oriented deployment of capital in the North would again reduce the pressure on the South to produce needs-oriented exports. This is the time to study this set of interactions as extensively and systematically as possible. For this reason, our project has worked closely with and extended the results of the very ambitious, longer term UNITAR project that examines, especially, the interactive effects of technological choice in various domains of activity in both North and South to assess their effects on development constraints and choices. In the IFDA context, our attempt has been to use the UNITAR data to examine political consequences of technological choice, specifically impacts on the degree and variety of authoritarianism. (Also, IFDA studies have gathered data that has, in turn, influenced the elaboration and sophistication of the UNITAR model, achieving a genuine reciprocity of results.)

III

To illustrate more fully the direction taken in one part of our project, we present here three summaries of country studies. Each study is designed to illuminate a special aspect of the relationship between the global setting and authoritarianism in a Third World national setting. Each illustrates our basic contention: global and national setting mutually reinforce tendencies toward some form of authoritarian politics. The three studies here are a sample of the work so far completed.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND PHILIPPINE AUTHORITARIANISM

by Robin Broad

The traditional arguments for the emergence of overt authoritarianism (in the guise of Martial Law) in the Philippines in 1972 fail to delve into the neo-colonial system to discover the international roots. Through its domination of the multilateral and bilateral assistance institutions, the United States imposed its power on the Philippine system, constraining the economic, social and political development of its former colony.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) played the strategic role in the evolution of this relationship in the period between the granting of Philippine independence and the declaration of Martial Law through calculated moves to open the economy and achieve discipline. The World Bank and US economic assistance prepared the Philippines for increased exploitation by American interests, both through projects that directly benefited US transnational corporations and through programmes that developed a controlling domestic elite whose concerns meshed with those of the American corporate mind. The key component of force was contributed by US military assistance which gave to the Philippines an understanding of how to control its people, as well as the men and machines to do so.

Together, these international actors played a paramount role both in the transition from import substitution development strategy of the 1950s to export-oriented growth, and, as the requirements of the international system evolved, in the gradual post-World War II transformation towards overt authoritarianism. From that point, these US-backed international institutions worked to hasten the institutionalization of the Martial Law regime, retaining and augmenting privileges for the transnational corporate interests they represented.

Even if Martial Law were officially lifted, little would change for the Philippines. On one level, this observation results from the domestic institutionalization of the Marcos regime, which leaves all Martial Law decrees, general orders and letters of instruction as laws of the land. Yet, such institutions are merely symbols of the international links and, as long as the links remain, there can be no true development for the majority of Filipinos. Marcos himself is not special. His position could be held by any one of a number of the Philippine elite, as he well realizes - which is why he reacts with more alarm over "subversive" actions by members of the political elite than by radical segments of the population.

The old society elite - who had stood in opposition to Marcos and are beginning to stand in opposition again - continue to look (as they were taught many years back) to the US for assistance in putting one of them in Ferdinand Marcos's place. Until now, the international actors have opted for the uninterrupted stability offered by supporting the Marcos dictatorship. Yet, as the voices of the villagers are raised, the international actors, learning from mistakes in Iran, Nicaragua and South Korea, may well decide that minimizing instability - and avoiding revolution - requires abandoning Marcos and turning to one of the other elites who could cover the iron fist of Martial Law, yet continue to rule in American interests.

The point here is that the subordination of Filipino development policy to the priorities of an external imperial actor is the primary force shaping the national governing process. Authoritarianism emerged as a result of the neo-colonial economic system. Over the past thirty years, the Philippine economic system has become so intimately integrated with these international institutions that formal authoritarianism means much less than in many other countries or, indeed, than it meant in 1972. The Philippines' fate is that of a semi-colonial feudal economy supplying raw materials to the US through transnational corporations backed by international actors who, with an ever stronger grip, lend support and credibility to social and political stability. As long as the Philippines remains an underling in that system, cosmetic changes at the top will bring no real change for the Filipino people.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN

by John Cavanagh

The study on Iran examines a thesis, which has several variants, that has been expounded by defenders of the recent Shah's regime: Iran's authoritarian political system allowed, and was indeed essential for, the rigid modernization of the nation's agriculture and industry. Proponents of this thesis encouraged the widespread perception that a mullah-led opposition to "modernization" would have sabotaged the Shah's efforts had they not been kept under firm authoritarian control. It is true that during the most recent stage of authoritarian rule (1953-79), rapid shifts (call them "modernization" if you will) were achieved in agriculture and industry. It is equally true that the shifts were carried through via the regime's suppression of dissenting voices (e.g., the Majlis - Iran's "parliament" - was simply dissolved at the onset of the land reform). This much the evidence does not contest.

The more revealing task, however, is to examine the nature of the "modernization" in both agriculture and industry and to assess who benefitted and by how much, and what brand of overall development was promoted. It is the thesis of this work that the Shah's "modernization" exacerbated income disparities (leaving substantial numbers absolutely worse off), accelerated an urbanization characterized by poverty, reduced many persons' access to food, established an industrial shell completely inappropriate for Iran's long-term needs, and ill-adapted to Iran's capabilities.

With respect to agriculture, first, the reforms left a highly unequal imprint on different classes of the peasantry, failing to improve the economic condition of a large fraction in the countryside. Second, the reforms have failed in production terms, with respect to both yields and agricultural self-sufficiency. Iran dove from a situation of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs in the early 1960s to importing food valued at nearly \$1.6 billion in 1976. Finally, increasing numbers of landless peasants and lack of improvement in conditions for certain rural sectors motivated one of the most rapid rural-to-urban migrations in history.

Further, this distorted development was orchestrated by, and benefitted most, the internal and external class groupings that supported authoritarianism. In

this sense, the "modernizations" helped strengthen the very structure of authoritarianism itself. These findings lead to the general proposition that in the case of resource-abundant underdeveloped capitalist countries (Iran's oil reaped over \$20 billion annually by the later 1970s), authoritarianism can nurture and accelerate a "modernization" which benefits a relatively small domestic and international elite. In Iran's case, authoritarianism certainly did not promote economic or social development for the majority.

This paper's three sections chart first the groups and institutions that formed the roots and provided the maintenance and nurturing of authoritarianism in Iran. Second, the motivations and execution of agricultural "modernization" are studied with the intent to pinpoint those who promoted and benefitted from the developments under the authoritarian Shah. Finally, the Shah's rapid yet inefficient and heavy industrialization is examined - an industrial scheme built on high tariffs, corruption and external dependence.

The spectacular result in Iran's case is that even its vast oil wealth did not allow it to avoid an authoritarian political evolution that isolated the rulers from the people and undermined claims to exercise legitimate authority. The hyper-modern development strategy, despite impressive GNP growth rates, relied on technology and assistance that revealed Iran's dependence, especially in the security sphere, on the United States. Thus, even without any capital shortage, the dynamics of a development strategy oriented around First World thinking on "modernization" resulted in a dependence/hegemony relationship between Iran and the USA.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA

by Shantabai Metelits

The case study on Malaysia consists of two separate sections on the political economy of a country characterized by ethnic diversity and export-led growth. Authoritarianism, aided by major international actors, has deepened in the Federation of Malaysia despite the existence of three ethnic groups each contending for national political supremacy; indeed, authoritarian control by the elite of the majority Malays has flourished in part through the exacerbation of ethnic cleavages with the minority Chinese and Indians. The first portion of the case study attempts to unravel the evolution and the mechanisms of authoritarian rule in ethnically diverse nations of which Malaysia is a primary example.

The major characteristics of authoritarianism in Malaysia are a lack of constitutionalized access to the avenues of civil disobedience as a means of effecting political change, a powerless judiciary that stifles dissent, emasculated trade unions, an elite-dominated military trained and armed by Malaysia's trading partners and the total suppression of speech and action even in the House of the Malaysian Parliament. Policies of the Malaysian government, such as the Rukunegara Ideology and The New Economic Policy instituted without dissent in their passage, serve to further exploit the cleavages of a multiracial society without interrupting the flow of international commodities trade in rubber and tin. A national identity, the subject of much rhetoric, is neither in the

process of formation nor is it encouraged by the international interferences in the Malaysian political economy.

Historically, the formation of the Malaysian polity into one that serves Malaysian needs and not international balance of power has been suppressed. Hence, the Malaysian Communist Party, a national party which grew out of the opposition to the annexation of Malaysia by the Japanese, was outlawed by the British. At a later period, the Australians entered a war of independence of Sarawak and Borneo which, as a result, became part of Greater Malaysia. With the support of Great Britain, Malaysia expelled Singapore from the Greater Malaysia pact, thus retaining a racial split in its population pattern that could more easily be exploited. The United States, Malaysia's major trading partner, trains and supplies the military, with the concurrence of the Malay elite.

Projects of international organizations, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have had a direct impact on modernizing the Malaysian economy to strengthen its international export links while retaining the skewed pattern of distribution of income along historical divisions. The Malaysian government relies on the total suppression of national debate to proceed with modernization. But, while the GNP of Malaysia has increased, the gap in income between the elite and the masses has also increased. Steps towards an autonomous Malaysian political system have strong counteracting links to international actors. The pattern of Malaysian development is similar to that of the Philippines and Iran, with increasing authoritarianism that keeps pace with exploitive economic policies.

The importance of this case study rests on the links between poverty and equitable income distribution and the ability of a small country to proceed with national integration and identity formation without the interference of more powerful members of the global community. The increasing growth of authoritarianism within Malaysia appears to be the result of its increasing links with its trading partners, thereby reflecting on the national level the influence of hegemonial global pressures.

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CONCLUSION

We suggest, in a tentative spirit, several conclusions:

1. Each national 'case' of authoritarian rule is distinctive and it is linked to certain common structural aspects of the international political order or system. Therefore, the subject-matter of authoritarianism and development needs to be studied at the global and the country levels.
2. The presence of authoritarian rule, however objectionable, does not preclude various steps that can be taken to promote needs-oriented development policies and approaches. The alliance between authoritarian rulers and economic plunderers may be more or less close (compare, for instance, Brazil and Shah's Iran on this). The important point here is to consider the empirical situation so as to discover the creative political space that exists to move development policy in more humane directions in a given country.

3. Such a development-oriented perspective should be balanced against political and moral considerations. Under what conditions is it acceptable to promote economic solutions that "stabilize" a brutal regime? Again, the particularities of the national case must be assessed and studied.
4. International models and images are helpful in sorting out links between policies in the North and their effects in the South. For instance, to what degree do inhibitions on foreign investment weaken the pressures in countries in the South to impose wage repression or labour discipline? How do technology choices in the North constrain development options in the South? The IFDA work here builds on the creative achievements of the UNITAR model, especially to draw out the authoritarian implications for the South of economic policies pursued in the North. Such an emphasis overcomes the liberal insistence that authoritarian politics in the South is a reflection of anti-democratic tendencies in the given country and that aid or support should be withheld until a given Third World country "gets its house in order".
5. The increasing arms flow from North to South is both a special case of 4, shaping and distorting development planning (e.g., to pay for arms imports) and also a lever (via training programmes, spare parts supply, advisors) of influence that encourages repressive governance. Also, the relative upgrading of the military sector in the Third World countries, making it relatively more modernized and efficient than other aspects of the governing/political process, encourages militarized politics (coups, takeovers, para-military police reform, and the like). Therefore, arms sales and transfers need to be understood as having an integral bearing on the development process.
6. New roles for international financial institutions (IFIs) suggest their contribution in general and in specific cases to authoritarian political outcomes (perhaps against the will of a given set of leaders). Considering the identity and ideology of those controlling IFIs, this pattern of transnational influence, enjoying considerable legitimacy as benevolent force in the world, requires careful scrutiny to differentiate positive and negative effects in specific countries. Also, it will be important to distinguish among IFIs with regard to their sensitivity on these matters.
7. The objectives and power of transnational corporations contribute, also, to a domestic and international setting disposed toward the adoption of authoritarian political solutions. Often in the adopted name of "growth", "efficiency", and "stability". The economic case for authoritarianism can be refuted by specific explanations of such phenomena as changes in GNP and inflation trends.
8. Aside from economic and geopolitical considerations, the steady growth of population adds pressures to the governing processes, especially in an era of perceived ecological constraint and depleted resources. These pressures work against forms of humane governance based on respect for individual and group rights. A global human rights movement is an important counter to these authoritarian tendencies.

BUILDING BLOCKS

THE NEO-FASCIST STATE: NOTES ON THE PATHOLOGY OF POWER IN THE THIRD WORLD

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Abstract: Neo-fascism in the Third World has usually grown out of reformist or populist systems, in reaction to popular demands for social change or to threats to foreign economic interests. Unlike European fascism of the 1920s and 1930s, Third World neo-fascism is economically and politically dependent rather than nationalistic; it is characterized by an externally-oriented model of unequal growth. The doctrine of national security is its ideology, the armed forces its instrument, and systematic terror its defence against internal opposition. The instability of the neo-fascist system lies in its tendency to narrow its power base, eventually alienating even the national commercial bourgeoisie, and in its incapacity to respond to the material demands of society. The neo-fascist regime, with its foreign allies, thus becomes a highly visible target for mass discontent.

L'ETAT NEO-FASCISTE: NOTES SUR LA PATHOLOGIE DU POUVOIR DANS LE TIERS MONDE

Résumé: Le néo-fascisme dans le Tiers Monde a généralement suivi des expériences réformistes ou populistes en tant que réaction aux exigences populaires pour le changement social ou aux menaces aux intérêts économiques étrangers. Contrairement au fascisme européen des années 20 et 30, le néo-fascisme dans le Tiers Monde est économiquement et politiquement dépendant plutôt que nationaliste; il se caractérise par un modèle exogène de croissance dans l'inégalité. La doctrine de la sécurité nationale est son idéologie, les forces armées son instrument, et la terreur systématique sa défense contre l'opposition intérieure. L'instabilité du système néo-fasciste provient de sa tendance à rétrécir la base de son pouvoir, au point de s'aliéner même la bourgeoisie marchande nationale, et de son incapacité à répondre aux exigences matérielles de la société. Le régime néo-fasciste, avec ses alliés étrangers, devient ainsi un cible très visible pour le mécontentement des masses.

(Resumen español en la página 11(25).